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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1,

Have the petitioners shown "special and important reasons" justifying review by

writ of certiorari where their only argument is that the lower courts erred in deciding that there
was insufficient evidence of Cal Gas's negligence to withstand a motion for summary judgment?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply Utah law regarding summary judgment,

negligence and res ipsa loquitur in affirming the trial court's decision?

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEAU
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, which is published in 821 P.2d 458, is
included in the appendix.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals entered its decision in this matter on November 20, 1991. On
December 19, 1991, die plaintiffs and appellants sought an extension of time until January 20,
1992, to petition for certiorari. They filed their petition for writ of certiorari on January 21,
1992 (January 20 being a legal holiday). This court has jurisdiction to grant or deny the petition
for writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2), (3)(a) and (5).

CONTROLLING RULES OF LAW
This case does not involve controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances,
or regulations.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts
The plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips, brought this action against Cal Gas

Company and C.R. England & Sons, Inc., seeking damages for personal injuries they suffered
when the tractor-trailer they occupied overturned on Interstate 80 near Wendover, Utah. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were negligent and that their negligence proximately caused
the plaintiffs5 injuries. See Record ("R.") at 2-7. Cal Gas moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that any negligence on its part was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs* injuries. R.
at 87-98. That motion was denied. R. at 114, 136-37. Cal Gas then moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that there was no evidence that Cal Gas was negligent. R. at 179-84.
That motion was granted, R. at 308-12, and the plaintiffs appealed, R. at 315-16. (The plaintiffs
have settled with C.R. England.)
The appeal was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals. A panel of the Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's grant of Cal Gas's motion for summary
judgment in all respects. See Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct App. 1991).

B.

Statement of Facts
1.

In February 1986, the plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips, were truck

drivers for what is now A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc. R. at 3 17; Deposition of Joseph Richard
Kitchen ("Kitchen Depo.*) (R. at 327) at 12.
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2.

On February 5, 1986, Kitchen and Phillips drove an A.N.R. truck consisting of

a tractor and two trailers out of Los Angeles, California, heading for Salt Lake City. Kitchen
Depo. at 35-36.
3.

At about 11:30 p.m. on February 5, 1986, the plaintiffs pulled into the weigh

station at the port of entry near Wendover, Utah. Kitchen Depo. at 43, 97-98. A highway
patrol officer at the weigh station told Kitchen that there were patches of black ice beginning
about twelve to fourteen miles ahead and continuing on into Salt Lake City. Id. at 44 & 114.
4.

When the plaintiffs left the weigh station, Kitchen was driving, and Phillips was

in the truck's sleeping compartment. Deposition of Richard Allen Phillips ("Phillips Depo.")
(R. at 328) at 10-11.
5.

Shortly after the A.N.R. truck left the weigh station, it was passed by a Cal Gas

truck that appeared to be "in a hurry." Kitchen Depo. at 48-49, 74 & 113.
6.

Where the Cal Gas truck passed the A.N.R. truck, the road was wet but not icy.

Id. at 46, 48. -Citchen first encountered black ice fourteen or fifteen miles east of the point at
which the Cal Gas truck passed him. Id. at 46, 48-49.
7.

About twenty-five minutes after the plaintiffs left the weigh station, a Toyota pick-

up truck passed them. The Tsyota had been traveling in the left-hand lane, and the A.N.R.
truck was in the right-handfeLfeof the two eastbound lanes of traffic. Id. at 50, 73. As the
Toyota passed the A.N.R. truck, it turned on its high beams, and Kitchen saw "a shadow*1 in the
road ahead, "like a* glare . . . from the lights hitting on the object." Id. at 50, 79. The object
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was at least one-quarter mile away. Id. at 53. Kitchen could not tell if the object was stopped
or moving. Id. at 123.
8.

As the Toyota truck passed the A.N.R. truck, Kitchen slacked off the throttle to

slow down and let the Toyota truck into his lane. Id. at 51 & 79.
9.

As the A.N.R. truck slowed down, a C.R. England truck hit it from behind,

causing Kitchen to lose control of the A.N.R. truck. The A.N.R. truck overturned on its side,
injuring Kitchen and Phillips. Id. at 52, 79-80, 96-97; R. at 4 1 11.
10.

After the plaintiffs were pulled out of their vehicle, they saw the Cal Gas truck

overturned ahead of them, blocking the left-hand lane and part of theright-handlane. Kitchen
Depo. at 49, 51; Phillips Depo. at 12, 14. The A.N.R. truck never struck the Cal Gas truck.
In fact, the Cal Gas truck was some distance away.1
11.

There was no evidence as to how the Cal Gas truck overturned.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs have not offered any "special and important reasons" why this court should
grant review by writ of certiorari. Their only argument is that there were sufficient facts of

*
Kitchen estimated the distance to be less than 65 feet. Kitchen Depo. at 93. With
no citation to the record, the plaintiffs now put the distance at 200 feet. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari ("Petition") at 2. Newell Knight, the only expert witness in the case, put the
distance at over a quarter of a mile. Deposition of Newell Knight (R. at 329) at 106. In fact,
Mr. Knight, who was hired by C.R. England, concluded that the distance between the Cal Gas
truck and the A.N.R. truck was so great that there was no relationship between the Cal Gas
accident and the A.N.R. accident. LJ. at 100-02.
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record from which a jury could have concluded that Cal Gas was negligent. Two courts have
now considered and rejected this argument. The courts' conclusions are supported by established
Utah law governing the standard for summary judgment, negligence and res ipsa loquitur. The
plaintiffs5 petition for writ of certiorari should therefore be denied.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED ANY "SPECIAL AND
IMPORTANT REASONS" WHY THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW.
Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion. Utah R.
App. P. 46; Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5). A party seeking review by writ of certiorari has the
burden of demonstrating "special and important reasons" why the writ should be granted. Utah
R. App. P. 46. The type of cases in which such review is justified include cases in which one
panel of the Court of Appeals renders a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel or
in conflict with a decision of this Court; cases in which the Court of Appeals has decided an
important unsettled question of law that should be settled by this Court; and cases in which the
decision of the Court of Appeals "has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Id. None of these situations applies in
this case.
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The plaintiffs have not alleged, much less demonstrated, any "special" or "important11
reasons for granting their petition.2 They do not even cite Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
46, which sets forth the considerations governing review by certiorari. Rather, they concede that
this case is governed by general principles of tort law. Petition at 2. Their only argument is
that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing their negbgence claim against
Cal Gas to go to a jury. As shown below, the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly applied
controlling Utah law in granting Cal Gas's motion for summary judgment and in affirming that
judgment.

II.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CAL GAS'S NEGLIGENCE
TO WITHSTAND A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The plaintiffs claim that the standard for granting summary judgment, especially in
negligence cases, is "very restrictive." Petition at 7. In fact, "the plain language of Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."

*
Their Petition for Writ of Certiorari is simply a warmed-over version of their brief
on appeal. They have simply cut out portions to meet the shorter page limitation for petitions
for certiorari and changed the word "plaintiffs" to "petitioners." The Petition does not present
any argument or authority that the Court of Appeals has not already fully considered.

-6-

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).3 Utah appellate courts have not hesitated
to affirm summary judgments where the record is devoid of any evidence (or at least any
evidence that is not highly speculative) to establish an essential element of a negligence claim.4
Sfi£, &&, Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 415-16 (Utah 1990) (insufficient evidence of
negligence); Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985) (no proof that
the defendants' alleged negligence was the proximate cause of injury); Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d
1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) (no evidence of a dangerous condition that caused the accident);
Massey v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938-39 (Utah 1980) (insufficient evidence of
negligence); Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah 1973) (no evidence
of negligence); Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (1968) (no showing
of negligence); Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc.. 775 P.2d 445,446-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

*
Although Celotex was decided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is identical to the federal rule in all relevant respects. To the
extent that Utah rules are substantially similar to their federal counterparts, this Court has looked
to federal courts' interpretation of the federal rules in construing the Utah rules. See, e.g.T
Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1984).
4

The essential elements of a negligence claim are (1) a duty that the defendant owed
the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty (that is, negligence), (3) proximate cause, and (4) injury
in fact. Sfifi, jLg,, Williams y, Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App, 1991). The plaintiffs claim that each
of these elements presents a question for the jury. Petition at 10. In fact, the question of duty
is a question of law for the court. Sfig, fi^, Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989);
Weber v. Springville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). The other elements, like any
other fact question, present a question for the jury only if reasonable minds could reach different
conclusions from the evidence. Sfifi, &&., Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983).
€X Gray v. Scott. 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 328B &
328C (1963 & 1964).
-7-

(no evidence of negligence); Robinson V, IntermQTOtaifl Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262,264-67
(Utah Q . App. 1987) (insufficient evidence of negligence). This is true even where, as here,
the plaintiff also relied on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. Sfi£, e.g.. Hunt, 785 P.2d at 415-16;
RQhiflm 740 P.2d at 264-67.
The plaintiffs next argue that there were genuine issues of material fact on the issue of
Cal Gas's negligence, precluding summary judgment. However, bare allegations of negligence,
"unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of feet
as will preclude the entry of summary judgment." Massey, 609 P.2d at 938. The plaintiffs have
not specified any material fact that they claim was in dispute.5 They simply claim that, because
the trial court denied Cal Gas's motion for summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause
and because the issues of proximate cause and negligence are "intertwined," it was "illogical"
not to find a disputed issue of feet regarding negligence. Petition at 8. In fact, the dispositive
issue on Cal Gas's first motion was whether the negligence of the C.R. England truck was a
superseding cause of the accident. The trial court simply concluded that it could not say, as a
matter of law, whether C.R. England's negligence was foreseeable and hence a superseding cause
of the accident. £f. Harris V, Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219-20 (Utah 1983) (trial
court erred in not submitting the issue of proximate cause to the jury where reasonable minds
could have inferred from the evidence that a subsequent actor's negligence was foreseeable). It

5

Cal Gas concedes that there were genuine issues of fact, see SU£Q note 1, but none
of those facts was material to the issue of whether Cal Gas was negligent.
-8-

does not follow that, if C.R. England was negligent, then Cal Gas must have been negligent,
too.

It is not "illogical" to say that, on the one hand, the foreseeability of C.R. England's

negligence presented a jury question while, on the other hand, there was no evidence of Cal

Gas's negligence. £f. Reeves v, Oeigy Pharmaceutical, toe, 764 P.2d 636,642 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (dispute in the evidence as to causation was no bar to entry of summary judgment based
on undisputed evidence of no negligence). Therefore, the court's decision on Cal Gas's first
motion for summary judgment cannot create a factual dispute as to the Cal Gas driver's
negligence, nor can it satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of establishing Cal Gas's negligence.
Thus, the only issue the lower courts had to decide was whether the plaintiffs had made
a sufficient showing of Cal Gas's negligence to get to a jury. They correctly concluded that the
plaintiffs had not.
Both in the trial court and on appeal, the only relevant evidence that the plaintiffs relied
on to establish Cal Gas's negligence was the fact that the Cal Gas truck was overturned in the
road and that the road was slippery in places.6 See Petition at 10. That is simply not enough

*
In the lower courts the plaintiffs also suggested that the fact that the Cal Gas truck
appeared to be "in a hurry" when it passed the A.N.R. truck coming out of the weigh station
some 17-18 miles and 25-45 minutes before the accident, where the roads were not slippery,
supported an inference of negligence. There was no evidence as to how fast the Cal Gas truck
was going at the time (that is, that it was going too fast for existing conditions), and the evidence
was too remote to be admissible. See generally Annotation, Admissibility, in Action Involving
Motor Vehicle Accident, of Evidence as to Manner in Which Participant Was Driving Before
Reaching Scene of Accident. 46 A.L.R.2d 9 (1956), and cases cited therein. The trial court so
ruled on Cal Gas's motion in limine. See R. at 253, 308 & 312. Thus, the evidence was
insufficient to present a jury question because the jury never would have heard it. The plaintiffs
did not appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine. Nevertheless, the Court of
-9-

to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
The fact that there were patches of black ice on Interstate 80 from about mile post 15 on
into Salt Lake City says nothing about the Cal Gas driver's conduct at the time of the accident.
There is no evidence that the Cal Gas truck overturned because of the black ice, and even if
there were, that does not mean that the Cal Gas driver was negligent. Even the most careful
drivers travelling at the safest speeds can lose control of a vehicle on black ice. See 821 P.2d
at 464 ("Common experience and reason suggest black ice is a hazard that threatens even die
most reasonable and prudent driver").
Similarly, the fact that the Cal Gas truck overturned says nothing about the Cal Gas
driver's conduct. Utah courts have long held that the mere occurrence of an accident, without
more, does not support an inference that anyone was negligent. See, fe^, McCloud v. Baum.
569 P.2d 1125, 1127-28 (Utah 1977); Horsley v. Robinson. 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596
(1947). There was a presumption, based on the instinct for self-preservation, that the Cal Gas
driver was exercising due care for his own safety at the time his truck overturned. DeMille v.
Erickson. 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161 (1969), ceiL denied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970). The
presumption disappears only when the opposing party produces some evidence of negligence.
Where, as here, the plaintiffs have produced no evidence as to the Cal Gas driver's conduct, the

Appeals considered die evidence and concluded that the Cal Gas driver's being "in a hurry" so
long before the accident "cannot sustain an inference that the Cal Gas driver was speeding and
that such speeding continued after the roads became icy." 821 P.2d at 462. In any event,
judging from their petition, it appears that the plaintiffs have now abandoned the argument.
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presumption is not overcome, and it would be error to submit the issue of negligence to a jury.
462 P.2d at 161-62.
None of the cases the plaintiffs have cited is to the contrary. In each case where the issue
of the defendant's negligence was submitted to the jury, there was evidence of the defendant's
conduct at or shortly before the time of the accident, from which a jury could infer that the
defendant was negligent. See, e ^ , Hall v. Blackham. 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664, 665
(1966) (some evidence that the defendant handed a sandwich to the driver "immediately prior to
the accident," thereby distracting him); Horsley. 186 P.2d at 594 (evidence that the vehicle was
traveling at a "considerable speed" at the time of the accident and that the driver had sufficient
time to avoid the collision if he had been in control of the vehicle); Kellv v. Montova. 81 N.M.
591,470 P.2d 563, 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970) (disputed evidence that the defendant had parked
his car on the highway in violation of a safety statute before the accident occurred).7
Here the plaintiffs offered no evidence to establish that the Cal Gas driver was negligent.
As the Court of Appeals concluded, "There are numerous possible explanations as to why the
truck overturned, many of which would not involve the negligence of the driver and, in this case,
all of which require speculation. Submitting die issue of negligence to the jury would require
the jury to engage in mere speculation as to whether the Cal Gas driver was negligent. . . .

7

Although they have cited two Utah statutes, the plaintiffs never established in the
lower courts the evidentiary foundation necessary to establish a violation of either statute. Thus,
the statute, without more, cannot meet the plaintiffs* burden of establishing negligent conduct
on the part of Cal Gas. SSS King v. Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987).
-11-

[BJecause Kitchen and Phillips have not produced any evidentiary basis for a jury to find the Cal
Gas driver acted negligently, the trial court's summary judgment for Cal Gas on the issue of
negligence was proper/ 821 P.2d at 462-63.

HI.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT APPLY UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the lower courts erred in not allowing their negligence
claim to get to a jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under that doctrine, a jury may
infer negligence under certain circumstances notwithstanding a lack of evidence to show that the
other party acted negligently. However, before a party can proceed on a theory of res ipsa
loquitur, nthe party must satisfy a preliminary evidentiary foundation demonstrating that the facts
of the case properly present a res ipsa loquitur question/ 821 P.2d at 463 (citing Nixdorf v.
Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). Before the plaintiffs could rely on res ipsa loquitur,
they had to prove
(1) that the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would
not have happened had due care been observed; (2) that the plaintiffs own use or
operation of the agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the
injury; and (3) that the agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under the
exclusive management or control of the defendant.
Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980) (footootes omitted). The Court of
Appeals correctly found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the first element of res ipsa
loquitur. It therefore did not have to consider the other elements. See 821 P.2d at 464.
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To establish the first element of res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must present evidence that
the occurrence of the incident is "more probably than not caused by negligence." Ballow v.
Monroe. 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1985) (quoting Quintal V. Lawel Grpyg Hospital 62 Cal. 2d
154, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 397 P.2d 161, 171 (1964) (Traynor, C.J., concurring and dissenting)).
The plaintiff must show that "the balance of probabilities" weighs in favor of negligence. Id.
The mere fact that a driver loses control of his vehicle, even on an icy road, is not
sufficient to meet the first element of res ipsa loquitur. See, &&., Millonig v. Bakken. 112 Wis.
2d 445, 334 N.W.2d 80, 86 (1983); Wilson v. Rushton. 199 Kan. 659, 433 P.2d 444, 449
(1967); and authorities cited therein. As these authorities recognize, a vehicle can slide on an
icy road without fault on the part of the driver. Similarly, a truck can overturn for any number
of reasons, only a few of which involve the negligence of the driver. For example, the driver
could have had a sudden heart attack or stroke without any prior warning, or a deer or other
animal could have darted into his path, or he could have been confronted with some other sudden
emergency or mechanical failure, or a tire could have blown out, or he could have been
sideswiped or rear-ended by another vehicle, or his truck could have been overturned by some
natural force such as a sudden, strong gust of wind. The plaintiffs made no effort in the lower
courts to rule out any of these non-negligent explanations of the truck overturning, nor did they
introduce any evidence to show that, when a truck overturns, it is more likely than not because
the driver was negligent. In fact, based solely on the evidence in this case, one would have to
conclude that it is more likely than not that an overturned vehicle is not the result of the driver's
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negligence.

There was deposition testimony of three trucks overturning at one time or

another—the Cal Gas truck and the plaintiffs' truck in this case, and another A.N.R. truck that
plaintiff Kitchen had driven on another occasion. The plaintiffs do not claim that their truck
overturned because of their own negligence, and, according to Mr. Kitchen, the other accident
he was involved in was not the result of his negligence either. His trailer hitch broke, causing
his trailer to overturn. £ge Kitchen Depo. at 25-26. Thus, based solely on the record in this
case, one would have to conclude that more often that not trucks do not overturn as a result of
their drivers' negligence.

Because the plaintiffs failed to establish the first element of res ipsa

loquitur, they could not rely on that doctrine to meet their burden of showing negligence. See,
e.g.. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990); Ballow. 699 P.2d at 723; Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Carer Inc.. 740 P.2d 262, 265-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have not presented any "special and important reasons" why this court
should review the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. Moreover, the Court of Appeals'
decision correctly applied Utah law in concluding that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient
evidence of negligence to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, this Court
should deny the plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
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been charged at all, nor do they raise an
issue concerning a prosecutor's discretion
to charge a lesser crime as part of a plea
bargain. They argue only that they have
received prison sentences while others have
not and have therefore received unequal
protection of the laws.
In an effort to prove that other offenders
did not receive the same sentence as they,
plaintiffs offered as evidence clippings of
several newspaper articles and letters sent
to newspaper editors and an uncertified
copy of a judgment from a different district court in another case. Though these
items are all hearsay, the trial court did not
disallow this evidence. Instead, the court
ruled that all of the evidence was irrelevant, even if any of it showed that others
who were not entitled to the incest exception escaped incarceration, which it does
not The judge stated that the fact that
others may have received a sentence which
violated the statute did not justify sentencing plaintiffs in a similarly illegal manner.
The court ruled that inasmuch as plaintiffs
received the sentences required under the
law, their rights to equal protection were
not violated. The petition was dismissed,
and plaintiffs have appealed. We find no
error.
In essence, plaintiffs allege selective enforcement of the child sexual abuse laws.
However, even proof that they were tried,
convicted, and sentenced while others who
were convicted of the same crime went
unpunished does not show a violation of
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the
law. At best, the argument would show
only laxity in enforcement of the law. But
laxity in enforcement of the law with respect to others is not a defense to enforcement of the law against plaintiffs.2 Plaintiffs have failed even to allege that there is
an intentional and deliberate plan on the
part of state officials to enforce the law
selectively against them. Their argument
therefore fails.
2. See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 404-05 (Utah
1989); Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15
Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391, 395 (1964). Our
sister states are in accord. See People v. Thorpe,
641 P.2d 935 (Colo.1982); State v. Bowman, 104
Idaho 39, 655 P.2d 933 (1982); Pork Motel, Corp.

We have -carefully reviewed and considered the other points raised by plaintiffs
on appeal and find them also to be without
merit
Affirmed.

Joseph KITCHEN and Richard Phillips,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

CAL GAS COMPANY, INC., a California
Corporation, Defendant and
Appellee.
No. 910420-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 20, 1991.

Truck drivers injured in accident
brought suit against owner of truck which
overturned ahead of them, precipitating the
accident. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Frank G. Noel, J., rendered
summary judgment in favor of defendant,
and plaintiff drivers appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ., held
that: (1) there was no evidence of negligence to rebut presumption that defendant's driver was exercising due care, and
(2) accident was not the type which normally did not occur in absence of negligence,
as required for application of doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.
Affirmed.
v. Kansas Dep't of Health & Environment, 234
Kan. 374, 673 P.2d 1126 (1983); In re Initiative
Petition No. 272, State Question No. 409, 388
P.2d 290 (Okla.1963); Somer v. Woodhouse, 28
Wash.App. 262, 623 P.2d 1164 (1981).
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1. Negligence ^=»1
In negligence action, plaintiff has burden of establishing duty, breach of duty,
proximate cause and injury.

have happened had driver used due care, as
required to raise inference of negligence
under doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,

2. Negligence <S=>136(14)
Issue of negligence, or breach of legal
duty, is normally question of fact for jury.

James R. Black and Susan B. Black (argued), Wayne L. Black & Associates, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.

3. Judgment <S=>185.3(21)
Party may not merely rely on bald
assertions of negligence to overcome motion for summary judgment; to have negligence case submitted to jury, plaintiff must
submit sufficient evidence to establish prima facie case against defendant

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Fred R. Silvester, Charles P. Sampson and Paul M. Simmons (argued), Suitter, Axland, Armstrong
& Hanson, Salt Lake City, for Cal Gas.

4. Automobiles <3=242(1)
Where driver is unavailable to testify
as to his or her actions and there is no
other evidence of driver's actions, driver is
presumed to have been exercising due care.
5. Automobiles <s=*242(2, 4)
Mere fact that defendant's driver had
passed plaintiffs "in a hurry" some 45 minutes before the accident could not support
inference that driver was speeding and that
such speeding continued after roads became icy, and mere fact that defendant's
truck was overturned in the road did not
establish that driver acted negligently.
6. Negligence <s=>121.2(3)
To proceed on theory of res ipsa loquitur, party must establish that accident was
of kind which in ordinary course of events
would not have happened had defendants
used due care, instrument or thing causing
injury was at the time of the accident under management and control of defendant,
and accident happened irrespective of any
participation at the time by plaintiff.
7. Negligence <s=>121.2(9)
Once party satisfies preliminary evidentiary foundation for res ipsa loquitur,
there arises rebuttable inference of negligence which will carry the party's case
past motion for nonsuit.
8. Automobiles e=»242(2)
Mere fact that defendant's driver lost
control of truck on icy road was insufficient to establish accident of a kind which,
in the ordinary course of events, would not

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GARFF,
JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Plaintiffs Joseph Kitchen and Richard
Phillips appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of defendant Cal Gas Company,
Inc., in a negligence action stemming from
a truck accident. Kitchen and Phillips assert there are disputed issues of material
fact and, thus, the trial court erred in
granting Cal Gas's motion for summary
judgment. We affirm
FACTS
Kitchen and Phillips drove trucks for
A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc. (ANR).
Kitchen and Phillips drove an ANR truck
out of Los Angeles, California, heading for
Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 5, 1986.
They stopped at the port of entry east of
Wendover, Utah, early in the morning on
February 6th. At the weigh station, a
Utah Highway Patrolman warned Kitchen
and Phillips of black ice on Interstate
Eighty beginning twelve to fourteen miles
ahead, and continuing into Salt Lake City.
As the truckers left the port of entry,
Kitchen drove the ANR truck while Phillips
climbed into the "sleeper" part of the
truck's cab to rest. A Cal Gas truck
passed them five minutes after the ANR
truck left the port of entry. At the time,
Kitchen was driving the ANR truck approximately twenty to twenty-five miles an
hour on the wet, but not icy, interstate
highway. Kitchen testified the Cal Gas

460

Utah

821 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

truck passed "in a hurry," but he did not
attempt to estimate the Cal Gas truck's
speed.
Kitchen first encountered black ice approximately fifteen miles later. Kitchen
proceeded slowly, continuing to drive approximately twenty to twenty-five miles an
hour on the icy road, A Toyota pickup
truck passed the ANR truck in the left lane
of the two eastbound lanes of traffic four
miles after Kitchen first encountered black
ice and approximately forty-five minutes
after being passed by the Cal Gas truck.
The Toyota turned on its high-beam headlights as it passed Kitchen. According to
Kitchen, the Toyota's headlights illuminated a "shadow" lying across the road approximately a quarter mile ahead. When
Kitchen saw the "shadow" ahead, he took
his foot off the throttle, causing the ANR
truck to slow. Almost immediately, the
ANR truck was struck from behind by
another large truck owned by C.R. England
& Sons, Inc. The ANR truck overturned
on its side, and both Kitchen and Phillips
were injured. After Kitchen and Phillips
were pulled from the ANR truck, they recognized the "shadow" as the Cal Gas truck
that passed them earlier. The Cal Gas
truck was overturned approximately 200
feet ahead of the ANR truck and was
blocking the left lane and part of the right
lane of the eastbound traffic.
Kitchen and Phillips subsequently
brought this action against both C.R. England and Cal Gas, alleging that their truck
drivers' negligence caused Kitchen's and
Phillips's injuries. Prior to trial, Kitchen
and Phillips reached a settlement with C.R.
England. Thereafter, Cal Gas filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that,
even if the Cal Gas driver had operated the
Cal Gas truck negligently, such negligence
could not have been the proximate cause of
Kitchen's and Phillips's injuries. The trial
court denied this motion. Cal Gas subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment claiming there was no evidence that
the Cal Gas driver was negligent. The
trial court granted Cal Gas summary judgment, concluding, as a matter of law, that

on the undisputed facts before the court,
Cal Gas was not negligent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, Kitchen and Phillips assert
the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on the issue of Cal Gas's negligence. Summary judgment is proper when
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Utah R.Civ.P. 56 (1991). We review a trial
court's grant of summary judgment under
a "correctness" standard. Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 771 P.2d
1100, 1101-02 (Utah App.), cert denied,
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). We accord no
deference to the trial court's conclusion
that the facts are not in dispute nor the
court's legal conclusions based on those
facts. See Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780
P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App.1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). When determining if summary judgment is proper,
we view all relevant facts, including all
inferences arising from the facts, in the
light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. See Barlow Soc v. Commercial Sec Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah
1986).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON NEGLIGENCE
In this case, Kitchen and Phillips argue
summary judgment was improper because
there are disputed issues of fact as to
whether the Cal Gas driver's negligence
caused their truck to overturn and block
traffic. The Cal Gas driver died shortly
after the accident of causes unrelated to
the accident. Kitchen and Phillips offer no
direct evidence as to what caused the Cal
Gas truck to overturn because of the driver's death and the lack of other witnesses.
However, they assert a jury could infer the
Cal Gas driver was negligent in driving at
an excessive speed given the road conditions. Kitchen and Phillips claim this inference reasonably flows from Kitchen's testimony that the Cal Gas truck passed them
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"in a hurry" some forty-five minutes before the accident] and also from the undisputed facts concerning the poor road conditions existing on the morning of the accident.
Conversely, Cal Gas argues summary
judgment was proper because there is no
fact, or any reasonable inference drawn
from the facts, that establish the Cal Gas
driver was negligent. Cal Gas contends
the mere fact that the Cal Gas truck passed
the ANR truck forty-five minutes prior to
the accident cannot support any inferences
about the Cal Gas driver's conduct just
prior to the accident, particularly given the
substantially different road conditions existing where the accident occurred. Additionally, Cal Gas points out that Kitchen
and Phillips have offered no expert testimony as to the cause of the Cal Gas truck
overturning. The trial judge agreed with
Cal Gas, concluding: "on the undisputed
facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the Cal Gas driver
was negligent; therefore, any such finding
by a jury could only be based on speculation."

1991). The issue of negligence, or breach
of a legal duty, is normally a question of
fact for the jury. See Harris v. Utah
Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah
1983). Accordingly, summary judgment is
generally improper on the issue of negligence and only in clear-cut cases, with the
exercise of great caution, should a court
take the issue of negligence from the province of the jury. See Williams v. Melby,
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah
1982). However, a party may not merely
rely on bald assertions of negligence to
overcome a motion for summary judgment.
"Naked assertions of negligence, unsupported by any facts whatsoever . . . [fall]
far short of raising a material issue of fact
on the issue of negligence/' Massey v.
Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938-39
(Utah 1980).2 To have a negligence case
submitted to the jury, "[a] plaintiff must
submit sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case against the defendant."
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d
419, 497 P.2d 28, 30 (1972).

[1-3] In a negligence action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing four
elements: "that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty; that defendant breached
the duty (negligence); that the breach of
the duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury; and that there was in fact
injury." Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah App.

Initially, we recognize the Cal Gas driver
(and, through vicarious liability, Cal Gas)
owed Kitchen and Phillips a duty to act as
a reasonable and prudent truck driver
would have acted under the circumstances.
See Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639
P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981). We must decide
whether there is sufficient evidence of the
Cal Gas driver's breach of this duty to

1. At oral argument, counsel for Cal Gas indicated that at the same time the trial judge granted Cal Gas's motion for summan judgment, the
judge also granted Cal Gas's motion in limine to
exclude Kitchen's testimonx as to the Cal Gas
truck's speed when the Cal Gas truck passed
Kitchen
In bringing this to our attention,
counsel for Cal Gas seems to suggest the trial
judge did not take this evidence into consideration in ruling on Cal Gas's motion for summary
judgment, and likewise implies that we should
not consider this evidence.
Our independent review of the trial judge's
rulings suggests that the order in limine excluded the disputed portions of Kitchen's testimony
from trial, not from the consideration of the
matter for purposes of the summary judgment
ruling. There is no indication that the trial
judge did not consider this eudence when ruling on Cal Gas's motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, notwithstanding the order in limine,
we consider Kitchen's testimony regarding the
Cal Gas truck's speed in our review of the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.
2. See, e.g, Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531
P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah J973) (summary judg
ment for defendant proper where pleadings and
depositions showed no negligence or omission
of dut> of reasonable care), Dybowskt v Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446-47 (Utah App
1989) (summar) judgment for defendant proper
in slip and fall case where customer could not
offer any evidence that defendant mall owner
had acted negligentl)); Robinson v. lntermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah
App. 1987) (summary judgment proper on issue
of negligence where plaintiff has failed to se
cure expert testimony in medical malpractice
action).
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raise an issue of material fact, thereby
requiring us to overturn the trial court's
summary judgment on the issue of negligence.

er is exercising due care and that the presumption disappears only when the opposing party produces evidence of negligence.
Id. Because the plaintiff-decedent had produced no evidence as to the other driver's
conduct, the presumption remained intact
and thus the trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant driver.3 Id. 462 P.2d at 162.

14] Utah courts have long held that
"[t]he mere happening of [an] accident of
course does not prove that the defendants
were negligent.*' Horsley v. Robinson,
112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 (1947).
Rather, a plaintiff must offer some proof
of negligence to prevail at trial. See Massey, 609 P.2d at 938-39. Utah courts have
articulated this burden of proof principle as
a rebuttable presumption: Where a driver
is unavailable to testify as to his or her
actions and where there is no other evidence of the driver's actions, the driver is
presumed to have been exercising due care.
DeMille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462
P.2d 159, 161 (1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S.
1079, 90 S.Ct. 1531, 25 L.Ed.2d 814 (1970).

The DeMille presumption, which disappears when a prima facie case of negligence is presented, Pearce v. Wistisen, 701
P.2d 489, 495 (Utah 1985), is really no more
than an incorporation of the evidentiary
burden of proof in a negligence action.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof and
must establish a prima facie case to survive
summary disposal of the case. Lindsay,
497 P.2d at 30; Dybowski v. Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah App.
1989).

DeMille was a wrongful death action
arising from a head-on automobile collision
in which there were no survivors and no
eyewitnesses. Id. 462 P.2d at 160. The
only relevant evidence was that the decedent, on whose behalf plaintiff was suing,
had been driving several feet over the center line in the road when the accident occurred. At the close of evidence, both parties moved for a directed verdict. The
court ruled the decedent was negligent as a
matter of law for driving on the wrong side
of the road in the path of an approaching
automobile. However, the court denied
both directed verdict motions and submitted the issue of the other driver's negligence to the jury, which returned a verdict
for the plaintiff-decedent. Id. 462 P.2d at
161. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed, holding the lower court should
not have submitted the issue of negligence
to the jury. The DeMille court pointed out
that the plaintiff-decedent had submitted
no evidence of the other automobile driver's conduct. The court explained that,
because of the instinct for self preservation, the law presumes an automobile driv-

[5] In light of this authority, we must
now determine if Kitchen and Phillips offered any evidence of negligence to rebut
the presumption that Cal Gas's driver was
exercising due care at the time the truck
overturned. In this case, Kitchen and Phillips produced no evidence as to the Cal Gas
driver's negligence, and therefore, they
cannot survive a motion for summary judgment. The Cal Gas driver's being "in a
hurry" forty-five minutes prior to the accident cannot sustain an inference that the
Cal Gas driver was speeding and that such
speeding continued after the roads became
icy. Further, we cannot say the mere fact
that the Cal Gas truck was overturned in
the road establishes that the Cal Gas driver
acted negligently. There are numerous
possible explanations as to why the truck
overturned, many of which would not involve the negligence of the driver and, in
this case, all of which require speculation.
Submitting the issue of negligence to the
jury would require the jury to engage in
mere speculation as to whether the Cal Gas
driver was negligent. Accordingly, be-

3. The presumption outlined in DeMille was established in earlier Utah cases See Mecham v
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P.2d 285, 290 (1953),
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot, 120 Utah
453, 235 P.2d 515, 517 (1951). The DeMille

presumption uas recently reaffirmed in Pearce
v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah 1985) (presumption of due care rebutted where evidence
indicated deceased acted negligently).
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cause Kitchen and Phillips have not produced any evidentiary basis for a jury to find
the Cal Gas driver acted negligently, the
trial court's summary judgment for Cal
Gas on the issue of negligence was proper.4
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Alternatively, Kitchen and Phillips assert
the trial court erred in rejecting their argument that the Cal Gas driver's negligence
can be inferred under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
[6,7] Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which allows a party, in certain circumstances, to raise an inference that another party has acted negligently notwithstanding a lack of evidence concerning the
other party's actions.
[T]he purpose of res ipsa loquitur is "to
permit one who suffers injury from
something under the control of another,
which ordinarily would not cause injury
except for the other's negligence, to
present his grievance to a court or jury
on the basis that an inference of negli4. Kitchen and Phillips contend the New Mexico
Court of Appeals decision in Kelly v. Montoya,
81 N.M. 591, 470 P.2d 563 (Ct.App.1970) should
persuade us to remand their case for a jury trial.
In Montoya, a truck passenger was injured
when the truck collided with defendants' vehicles. Defendants had stopped their vehicles
in the center of the road at the scene of a prior
collision that occurred during a sandstorm. Id.
470 P.2d at 564. The New Mexico court reversed the summary judgment for defendants,
holding that material issues of fact existed as to
whether defendants violated a safety statute prohibiting the leaving of vehicles on the highway.
The facts of Montoya, however, are distinguishable from the facts surrounding the accident in which Kitchen and Phillips were injured. In Montoya, there was clear evidence
that the defendants violated a safety statute.
The nature of defendants' conduct in Montoya
was not in dispute: they had parked their cars
on the road during the day. In our case, however, there is no evidence that the Cal Gas
driver's negligence caused the truck to overturn
and block the road. Thus, Montoya is not applicable here.
Likewise, Kitchen and Phillips argue that the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Horsley v.
Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (Utah
1947), mandates reversal. Again we find this
case distinguishable on its facts. In Horsley, a
bus passenger sued for injuries sustained in an
accident between a car and the bus. Because of
snowy and hazardous road conditions, the car
driver lost control of the car and crossed the

.gence may reasonably be drawn from
such facts; and cast the burden upon the
other to make proof of what happened."
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828,
833 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lund v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d
952, 954 (I960)). Accordingly, the fact that
Kitchen and Phillips failed to produce any
evidence of negligence does not, by itself,
preclude their res ipsa loquitur claim.
However, before a party is entitled to proceed on a res ipsa loquitur theory, the
party must satisfy a preliminary evidentiary foundation demonstrating that the facts
of the case properly present a res ipsa
loquitur question. See Nixdorf v. Hicken,
612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). This foundation consists of three parts:
(1) . . . [T]he accident was of a kind
which in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had the defendants) used due care, (2) the instrument
or thing causing the injury was at the
time of the accident under the management and control of the defendant, and
center line of a highway. The bus was coming
from the other direction and was unable to
avoid the car. The plaintiff was injured when
the force of the accident threw her head forward and she struck her neck on the seat in
front of her. Id 186 P.2d at 592-93. A jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff passenger and
the bus company appealed. In affirming, the
Utah Supreme Court held there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to infer the bus was driving at an excessive speed for the given road
conditions. Id. 186 P.2d at 599. There, the
plaintiff testified that when the accident occurred, the bus was traveling fifty miles per
hour, and that when the car crossed the center
line, the bus was a city block away. The Horsley court recognized that a jury could have reasonably found the bus driver did not have his
vehicle under sufficient control for the conditions and, therefore, the court affirmed the jury
award. Id 186 P.2d at 600.
Unlike this case, the Horsley court was able to
consider substantial evidence of the bus driver's
conduct; therefore, the "inference" did not arise
from the "mere happening" of an accident. The
Horsley court was faced with a substantial contradiction in testimony, not with the complete
lack of testimony as to the bus driver's conduct,
as is the case here with regard to the Cal Gas
driver's conduct. Accordingly, Kitchen and
Phillips cannot rely on Horsley to raise an inference that the Cal Gas driver acted negligently.
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Courts from several jurisdictions have
held that the mere fact that a driver has
lost control of a vehicle on icy roads is
insufficient
to meet the first prong of the
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical
res
ipsa
loquitur
test. See, e.g., Millonig v.
Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990)
Bakken,
112
Wis.2d
445, 334 N.W.2d 80,
(quoting Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96,
86-87
(1983)
(rear-end
collision resulting
297 P.2d 221, 224 (1956)). Once a party
from
icy
roads
does
not
raise inference of
makes this showing, there arises a "rebutnegligence
under
res
ipsa
loquitur as skidtable inference of negligence which will
ding
on
ice
can
occur
without
fault of drivcarry the [party's] case past the motion for
er);
Wilson
v.
Rushton,
199
Kan.
659, 433
nonsuit." Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354.
P.2d
444,
449
(1967)
(automobile
passenger
Therefore, to determine if Kitchen and
Phillips were entitled to proceed under a could not sustain burden under first prong
res ipsa loquitur theory, we must evaluate of res ipsa loquitur test in injury action
the evidence in light of the above three-part arising from accident in which driver
passed another automobile just as the road
test.
had suddenly changed to ice); see also 4
[8] Under the first prong of the test, Fowler V. Harper, Flemming James, Jr. &
we must determine whether the accident in Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 19.7 at
question was the kind which ordinarily 57 (2d ed. 1986) (mere fact of vehicle sliding
does not occur in the absence of negli- on icy road insufficient to raise inference of
gence. Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196. Kitchen negligence under first prong of res ipsa
and Phillips argue that, normally, a truck loquitur test).
does not roll over in the absence of negliWe agree with this authority as we cangence. Cal Gas, on the other hand, asserts
not say that when a driver loses control of
that because there is no evidence from
a vehicle on icy roads, the driver, more
which to infer negligence, and because of
likely than not, was negligent. Common
the icy road conditions, it is not more likely
experience and reason suggest black ice is
than not that the Cal Gas truck overturned
a hazard that threatens even the most readue to its driver's negligence.
sonable and prudent driver. Accordingly,
The Utah Supreme Court has recently we find that Kitchen and Phillips have not
outlined the analytical framework for de- met their burden under the first prong of
ciding the first prong of the res ipsa loqui- the res ipsa loquitur test.
tur test:
Because Kitchen and Phillips have failed
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury to show that the accident was, more likely
instruction on res ipsa loquitur, the than not, the result of the Cal Gas driver's
plaintiff must have presented evidence negligence, thus failing to meet the first
that the occurrence of the incident is prong of the res ipsa loquitur test, it is
"more probably than not caused by negli- unnecessary for us to consider the other
gence." The plaintiff need not eliminate two prongs of the test. Accordingly, we
all possible inferences of non-negligence, affirm the trial court's ruling rejecting
but the balance of probabilities must Kitchen's and Phillips's res ipsa loquitur
weigh in favor of negligence, or res ipsa claim.
loquitur does not apply.
CONCLUSION
Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah
(3) the accident happened irrespective of
any participation at the time by the plaintiff.

1985) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Further, the court recognized that "[w]hen,
however, the probabilities of a situation are
outside the realm of common knowledge,
expert evidence may be used to establish
the necessary foundational probabilities."
Id.

In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's
summary judgment dismissing Kitchen's
and Phillips's claim. Kitchen and Phillips
produced no evidence that the Cal Gas driver was negligent. Furthermore, they cannot rely on the evidentiary doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to escape summary judgment
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as the accident is not the type which normally does not occur in the absence of
negligence.

eral appearance," which gave trial court
personal jurisdiction over him.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

BENCH and GARFF, JJ, concur.
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John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Clair J. Jaussi, Provo, for plaintiffs and
appellees.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GARFF,
JJ.

David C. BARLOW and Clare O. Barlow,
d/b/a Barlow's Wood Classics, Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Alan J. CAPPO, d/b/a Western Building
Center, Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Alan J. Cappo, d/b/a Western Building
Center, appeals from an order denying his
motion to quash service of summons and
set aside judgment.

No. 910417-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 21, 1991.

Civil action was commenced. After entering default judgment, the Fourth District Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding,
J., denied defendant's motion to quash any
return of service, and defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that
defendant's motion to dismiss on ground of
forum non conveniens was general appearance, which gave lower court personal jurisdiction over him.
Affirmed.

Appearance <3»9(5), 19(1)
Defendant's motion to dismiss on
ground of forum non conveniens was "gen1. Rule 4(f)(2) of the 1989 version of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provided.
In circumstances ... justifying service of
summons by publication, if the party desiring
service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the facts from which the court
determines thai service by mail is just as
likely to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that service of

FACTS
Appellees David C. Barlow and Clare 0.
Barlow, d/b/a Barlow's Wood Classics
(Barlows), mailed to appellant Alan J. Cappo (Cappo) a complaint, motion and order
for alternative service by mail. The complaint was filed on June 8, 1989. The motion for alternative service by mail, along
with the affidavit, was filed June 6, 1989
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
4(f)(2) (1989).1
On August 3, 1987, Cappo filed a motion
to dismiss Barlows' action on the ground
that the forum was not convenient. Cappo
characterized this motion as a special appearance. He requested that the action be
dismissed and then be filed in Colorado,
arguing that various warranty claims existed upon Barlows' products sold in Colorado, that all of the witnesses required to
prove said claims were in Colorado, that
much of the evidence was in Colorado, and
summons shall be given by the clerk mailing
a copy of the summons and complaint to the
party to be served at his address, or his last
known address. Service shall be complete ten
days after such mailing.
This Rule has since been changed and its corresponding version can be found in Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 4(g) (1991).
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CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. #4 658
of and for
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Attorneys for Cal Gas Corporation
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH KITCHEN and
RICHARD PHILLIPS,
Plaintiffs,

]
1
]>
>

v.

]

C. R. ENGLAND & SONS, INC., a
Utah corporation, and CAL GAS
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation,

]
]
]1
]
)
]

Defendants.

ORDER IN LIMINE
AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. C87-02515
Judge Frank G. Noel

The Court having reviewed defendant Cal Gas1 motion in
limine to exclude evidence of speed and Cal Gas* motion for
summary judgment; having considered the memoranda of defendant
Cal Gas and plaintiffs Kitchen and Phillips; having heard
arguments of counsel as to Cal Gas' motion for summary
judgment; and having granted plaintiffs* motion to publish all
discovery and having considered same;
The Court finds on the undisputed material facts
viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the
Cal Gas driver was negligent, therefore any such finding by a
jury could only be based on speculation.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,_ ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1,

Defendant Cal Gas' Motion in Limine is granted;

2.

Defendant Cal Gas' Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted and plaintiffs' claims against Cal Gas are dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits•
The Court further finds pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no
just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs entry of
judgment for defendant Cal Gas on plaintiffs* claims.
DATED this

day of January, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
& ^

!S R. BLACK'/^ESg.
BLACK<
JAMES

/orney for Plaintiff

JOHN|M. CHIPMAN, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
C.__R. England & Sons
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